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In this paper we develop a discrete model of optimal taxation of married couples and 
empirically discuss the optimality of income taxation for this group. To this end, we derive the 
social welfare function which guarantees that joint taxation of married couples is optimal. We 
will contrast this welfare function with the one that makes a system of individual taxation 
optimal. For the empirical application we use a static structural labor supply model to 
estimate the preferences of households. We find that the system of joint taxation is only 
optimal when the government has a high taste for redistribution towards one-earner couples 
and a very low or even negative taste for redistribution towards couples in which both 
partners earn a similar amount of income. In contrast, the optimality of individual taxation is 
less dependent of the working composition within the household. 
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It is the aim of the paper to provide empirical evidence about the optimal design of income taxation
of married couples. Recent theoretical contributions on the optimality of income taxation of married
couples, namely Alesina et al. (2007) and Kleven et al. (2008), provide evidence for the desirability
of a negative jointness of income taxation of both spouses. This implies that it is optimal to design a
tax schedule with lower marginal tax rates for the secondary earner. This is in strong contradiction
to joint income taxation with full income splitting as implemented in several countries such as
France or Germany (e.g. Apps and Rees (1999)). The design of income taxation in these countries
imposes high marginal tax rates for the secondary earner.1
This contradiction motivates the central research question of this paper. It is the purpose of
this analysis to empirically derive the government’s social welfare function which guarantees that
joint taxation of married couples is optimal. We will contrast this welfare function with the one
that makes a system of individual taxation of married couples optimal. Hence, our analysis follows
the work of e.g. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2008) who invert a model of optimal taxation to derive
the welfare function and the redistributive taste of the social planner.
When studying optimal income taxation of married couples the redistributive taste of the gov-
ernment is quite complex. On the one hand, the government transfers money to married spouses
with low household earnings and the progressivity of the tax schedule leads to higher taxation of
richer households. On the other hand, relative to individual taxation, the system of joint income
taxation ceteris paribus subsidies households with higher earnings. This splitting advantage de-
pends on both, the total earnings, and the intra-household inequality of earnings which determines
the share of the spouses on the total household earnings. Ceteris paribus, the higher the intra-
household inequality, the larger is the splitting advantage. Thus, the central question of this study
is to show in how far the government discriminates couple households by intra-household inequality
when assuming that either joint income taxation or individual taxation is optimal according to the
proposed framework of optimal taxation.
The theoretical framework which underpins our empirical application builds on the discrete
model of optimal taxation of single agents suggested by Saez (2002). For our application it is
necessary to explicitly model the utility maximization of households. We simplify the maximization
1For a more detailed discussion of the joint taxation systems in Europe see Dingeldey (2001).
2problem of the household and assume the husband to be the ﬁrst earner who has a ﬁxed labor supply
of full-time work. We allow for three diﬀerent earnings types of men with diﬀerent levels of yearly
gross earnings. Given the earnings level of her husband, the wife optimally chooses her labor supply
and can adjust her behavior ﬂexibly along the extensive and the intensive margin.
The optimal design of income taxation crucially depends on the labor supply behavior of house-
holds. In this analysis we follow Blundell et al. (2006) and use a static structural labor supply
model to estimate the household preferences which determine the labor supply behavior of the wife.
This allows us to account for the heterogeneity of labor supply behavior by earnings and by other
demographic characteristics. Moreover, for the comparison of joint and individual taxation, we can
take account of the endogeneity of the female labor supply decision with respect to the tax regime.
This is in contrast to most of the previous applications of the optimal tax theory which have been
based on exogenously assumed labor supply elasticities.
In the empirical application of the theoretical model we draw on data from the German Socio
Economic Panel (SOEP) and use the structural estimates of labor supply behavior together with
a microsimulation model to analyze the optimality of joint taxation in Germany. We confront the
optimal welfare weights for the German system of joint taxation with the optimal welfare weights
we derive for a hypothetical scenario of individual taxation in Germany.
Several studies have discussed the ﬁscal, distributional and labor supply eﬀects of joint income
taxation with full income splitting relative to individual taxation. Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) ﬁnd
that in Germany joint taxation subsidizes married couples by roughly 20 billion Euro per year and
that a shift to individual taxation would go along with a markable increase in female labor supply.
These ﬁnding point in the same direction as the conclusions derived by Alesina et al. (2007) and
Kleven et al. (2008).
We ﬁnd that the marginal welfare weights that make a system of joint taxation optimal are
quite diﬀerent from those welfare weights that guarantee optimality for individual taxation. While
overall in both systems the optimal marginal welfare weights tend to decrease with gross earnings of
the secondary earner (in our application by assumption the wife), the shape of the welfare function
is quite distinct. Under joint taxation the optimal marginal welfare weights at higher earnings
of the wife are much lower that under individual taxation. This result is even re-enforced when
deriving the marginal welfare weight by intra-household inequality. We show that the system of
joint taxation is only optimal when the government has a high taste for redistribution towards
3couples with a high intra-household inequality, i.e. where the secondary earner is not working, and
a very low or even negative taste for redistribution when both partners earn a similar amount.
Under individual taxation this is diﬀerent. The optimal marginal welfare weights are only slightly
decreasing with the inequality within the household. In other words, in this scenario the optimality
depends less on the working composition within the household.
2 The theoretical model
The theoretical framework we develop builds on the discrete model of optimal taxation suggested
by Saez (2002). We modify the model of Saez along several lines to make it appropriate for our
research question. For our application it is necessary to explicitly model the utility maximization
of households. In contrast to Alesina et al. (2007) who model the collective bargaining between the
spouses and Kleven et al. (2008) who apply a unitary household model we simplify the household
maximization problem and assume that the wife maximizes the household utility conditional on
the husbands behavior, see e.g. (Killingsworth, 1983). In our framework the husband is assumed
to work full-time.2 This simpliﬁcation together with the assumption of a discrete optimal tax
model as in Saez (2002) allow us to combine the theoretical model directly with the structural
estimation of the preferences of the household. We extend the model of Saez (2002) as we allow
for ﬂexible behavioral responses of the wife on both the extensive and intensive margin and by
explicitly accounting for income eﬀects.
2.1 The household problem
The economy consists of households indexed by h ∈ H. Households may diﬀer by total household
gross earnings, and by the working hours composition, which deﬁnes the relative share each spouse
earns. A household h derives utility from the joint consumption level and disutility from the spouses’




Ch is the vector of possible household consumption levels, which depends on the particular
2At ﬁrst glance this often applied conditional utility maximization might seem restrictive. However, empirical
evidence suggests that cross elasticities between spouses are either not signiﬁcant or of little importance (Steiner and
Wrohlich, 2004) and this provides evidence for the assumption of the exogeneity of male working behavior.
4tax regime. We will denote by Ch
j the household consumption level under tax regime j, with j
∈ {joint,individual} taxation respectively.
We assume that labor earnings are the only source of income and that households do neither
save nor borrow. When married couples are taxed jointly with full income splitting, the budget














where ωm and ωf are the wages of the husband and the wife and Lm and Lf are the hours of
work of each spouse, husband and wife respectively. Th is the net tax which includes transfers (TR),
social security contributions (SSC) and income taxation. Depending on the household earnings and
the family composition the net tax be either positive or negative.













f   L
h
f). (3)
The household net income is now determined by the sum of the individual tax payments includ-
ing SSC and the potential transfers which remain to be conditioned on the household level. Hence,




















which is the relative share of the male’s gross earnings over the household gross earnings. If
θ = 1, then the woman does not work, if θ = 0.5 both spouses work and contribute the same amount
to the total gross income. When income taxation is progressive it becomes obvious that the higher
the inequality of the gross earnings of the spouses, the larger the gain from income splitting relative
to individual taxation. For a married household in which both spouses work the same amount of
hours at the same wage rate, (θ = 0.5), the gain from income splitting is zero. In other words
the government does not subsidize married households with identical spouses in the system of joint
taxation.
5The household problem consists of choosing the optimal labor supply behavior which maximizes
the utility of the household given the budget constraint. As mentioned above we assume that the
husband has a ﬁxed labor supply at full time work. To allow for heterogeneity between the husbands
earnings we distinguish between three earning levels for the man, the high-earner, the medium-




the following we will analysis the three earnings scenarios separately and compare the results. This
allows us to derive results with respect to the overall household income.
The wife maximizes the household utility and chooses her optimal labor supply conditional on
the labor supply of her partner. The maximization program of each household with respect to the
above deﬁned budget constraints under joint (Equation 2) or individual (Equation 3) taxation can














We deﬁne the indirect utility of household type h, V h as the utility obtained in the household
optimum given the optimal labor supply decisions of the spouses:
V h = Uh(Lh∗
f ,Lh
m). (6)
The woman has the possibility of deciding not to work. This is the corner solution that optimality
condition for the interior solution does not reﬂect. If the diﬀerence between the household utility
level when the woman works and when she does not is very small or even negative the wife may
decide to stay at home. In particular we will talk about some reservation utility level that can
be related to the value of the woman’s home production. If this value for a particular household
exceeds some threshold R, it may not be optimal for the household that the wife participates on
the labor market. Formally we write this condition as a participation constraint for the wife:
V h
i − V h
0 ≥ R,
6where V h
0 represents the household indirect utility when the woman does not work and V h
i is
the indirect utility when the woman works some positive amount of hours.
Finally, given the wages and the ﬁxed labor supply of the husband, the chosen labor supply of






2.2 The government problem
As mentioned above, we analyze the optimal taxation of married couples in each particular scenario,
i.e. separately for each earning group deﬁned by the husband’s earnings. More precisely, we assume
that the government maximizes a social welfare function and sets optimally the net tax payment
for households depending on the earnings of the husband z ∈ {low,medium,high} and the wife’s
earnings. The social welfare function, Wz, is a weighted sum of indirect utilities of all household
within an earnings group given the gross household income. For each group there are continuous
earnings possibilities at the household level whose lower bound is deﬁned by the gross earnings
of the male in this group (Yz). The husband’s gross earnings are exogenously determined, while
the wife’s earnings are the combination of her labor supply decision and the exogenous wage she
may receive. In particular we assume there is some given density of woman’s earnings denoted by





The social welfare weights µh measure the redistributive taste of the social planner with respect
to the household type h. When studying the optimal taxation of married couples the redistributive
taste of the government is quite complex. On the one hand, the government transfers money to
married spouses with low household earnings and the progressivity of the tax schedule leads to
higher taxation of richer households. On the other hand, relative to individual taxation, the system
of joint income taxation may provide subsidies for households with higher earnings. This splitting
advantage depends on the total earnings and on the working distribution within the household.
This implies, a household with a high wage husband and a non-working wife has ceteris paribus a
3We could say without lose of generality that the woman has to choose between several occupations with diﬀerent
earnings, this is exactly what is assumed in Saez (2002).
7higher gain from joint taxation than the same household with a medium or low income husband.
In our framework, the intra-household inequality index is directly related to the female earnings as
the men’s gross earnings are ﬁxed. The comparison between the diﬀerent earnings groups will allow
to disentangle the splitting advantage by the intra-household inequality and by gross earnings.
The government may consider only I household categories indexed by gross household income
in each sector of the economy4, so that there exists a discrete number of net tax payments in this





i = Bz, (9)
where si are the population shares of each particular household category considered by the
government for each earnings group, which satisﬁes
PI
i=0 sz
i = 1 . The shares will be aﬀected by
the net income of the household and hence by the tax system. In other words, any change in the tax
schedule may aﬀect the proportion of households in each particular category. Therefore we model
the shares as a function of the possible net income levels in the economy.
Given the I diﬀerent earnings points the government chooses Tz
i ∈ {Tz
0 ,...,Tz
I } subject to the








2 < ... < Cz
I. The Tz
0 , represents the net income taxation for households where the
wife does not work and the total household gross earning is provided by the man.

















i = 1 for z ∈ {high,medium,low} (10)









i − Bz] (11)
with the following I ﬁrst order conditions for each net tax payment per household type:



















































































The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t to the tax rate in a particular category can be interpreted in terms
of two eﬀects induced by taxation: the equity eﬀect and the eﬃciency eﬀect. The equity eﬀect is
the ﬁrst part of the condition, where the marginal utility of income is weighted by the redistributive
taste of the government µh. The eﬃciency eﬀect measures the marginal cost of increasing the tax at
a particular category i which is the behavioral response of the household given a change in taxation
weighted by λ. Realize that in our model the household net income depends on the female working
hours since the labor supply decision is endogenous, and therefore the ﬁrst order conditions depend






















Following Saez (2002) we deﬁne the marginal social welfare weight of each household type given













The marginal social welfare weight has to be interpreted as the value for the government of
redistributing an extra unit of money uniformly to the households included in category i. In other
words, the marginal social welfare weights represent the government’s attitude toward redistribution
among household types in a given earnings group. The marginal social weight depends directly on
the marginal utility of income for households of diﬀerent types h included in category i and on the
9original social weight, µh. Moreover, it depends inversely on the marginal social cost (the Lagrange
multiplier) of increasing the net tax payment at the category i and on the population share of this
particular group.
Substituting equation 12, the ﬁrst order conditions for any Tz



















2.3 Mobility elasticities and marginal welfare weights inference
We deﬁne mobility elasticities to describe the behavioral responses of households given a change in
the tax system. For the empirical application of the model these elasticities can be estimated using
a static structural labor supply model. In our particular setting the husband has no behavioral
response; he is assumed to be always a full-time worker. On the contrary, the woman may decide
to stay at home (not to work) or to work at diﬀerent points along her gross earnings distribution.
Hence, the woman can react along the extensive and intensive margin of her labor supply. In this
respect we extend the model of Saez (2002) and allow the woman to choose and move to all discrete
earnings points at the intensive margin and not only at the adjacent points.
We deﬁne ϕi,j to be the mobility elasticity of the behavioral response between point i and j,




















This elasticity measures the relative change of the share from point i to point j given a relative
increase in the income diﬀerence between point j and i. For each earning point i there exist I-1
elasticities. The model of Saez is therefore nested in the framework when we would allow only for
the changes on the extensive margin and between the adjacent points on the intensive margin.









Then it can be shown that in the optimum the marginal social welfare weight for each category
of households i conditional on the group z has the following form:
10gz



















Proof. Equation (16) can be obtained in the following way. Given the assumption that the
women can move to all discrete earnings points, the share at a given category can be written as,
si = s(CI − Ci,...,Ci+1 − Ci,Ci − Ci−1,...,Ci − C1,Ci − C0). The ﬁrst order conditions w.r.t. Ti
can now be expressed as:

























For clarity in the proof we do not explicitly write the derivative of net income w.r.t labor, since
it does not aﬀect the result.
We make use of the symmetry of the marginal derivatives of the share w.r.t. the net income,
that is
∂si+j
∂(Ci+j−Ci) = − ∂si
∂(Ci+j−Ci). We rearrange terms and express (17) as:













Then, introducing the deﬁnitions of the mobility elasticities deﬁned above we obtain expression
(16).
3 Empirical Analysis
In order to empirically discuss the optimal design of income taxation it is necessary to empirically
solve the household’s maximization problem (Equation 5). We follow the procedure of Blundell et
al. (2006) applied as well in Haan and Wrohlich (2007) and use a static structural labor supply
model to estimate the household’s preferences for income and leisure. Based on these estimated
preferences it is then possible to derive the mobility elasticities deﬁned above that determine the
optimal tax schedule. The striking advantage of deriving the elasticities based on estimated prefer-
ences is the possibility of accounting for the heterogeneity of behavior conditional on demographic
characteristics by diﬀerent earning points. Moreover, the structural estimates allow us to model
11potential labor supply responses of women when analyzing the hypothetical tax system of individual
taxation.5
3.1 Estimation of the household preferences
We estimate the household preferences in a static structural discrete choice labor supply model,
similar as Aaberge et al. (1995) or van Soest (1995). The central advantage of a discrete speciﬁcation
over the continuous framework is the possibility to account for the non-linearities in the budget set
and to cope with the endogeneity of net-household income in a relative straight forward way. In
the discrete choice framework it is assumed that households receive utility from consumption and
leisure as deﬁned above in Equation (1) and from a random error term ik. Since we assume that
the labor supply of the husband is given, the parameter of interest are the preference of the wife’s
leisure and the preference of the household for consumption which equals the disposable income:
Vik = U(Cik,Lfik,Lm,Xi) + ik. (19)
According to the empirical distribution of female working hours we deﬁne K = 5 discrete
working alternatives for the women. Note, the K discrete working alternatives diﬀer from the I
gross earnings points the government chooses for the optimal tax schedule. Below, we will discuss
the diﬀerence in more detail.
For the empirical estimation we specify the utility function as a linear quadratic function in
consumption and female leisure and allow for interactions:
Uik = αcCik + αccC2
ik + αlfLfik + αlf2Lf2
ik + αclfCikLfik.
We assume that preferences vary across households through taste-shifters on consumption and
leisure coeﬃcients:
αc = αc0 + αc1X1,
αlf = αlf0 + αlf1X2, (20)
5Our procedure diﬀers from Aarberge and Colombino (2008) and Blundell and Shephard (2008). The authors
use a more general speciﬁcation of a static structural labor supply model than applied here and identify directly
(expressed as a utility function) the tax rule that maximizes a given welfare function.
12where X1 and X2 are vectors including age, number and age of children, and region of residence.
In addition we include dummy variables for the part time categories which might be interpreted
as ﬁxed costs of these working arrangements.6 We use the microsimulation model STSM (Steiner
et al. 2008) to derive the potential consumption level at each discrete hours working alternative.
More precisely, for each discrete hours point we calculate the gross household earnings which is
the sum of the observed earnings of the husband and the state speciﬁc earnings of the wife. The
gross earnings of the women are simply the state speciﬁc hours multiplied by her expected market
wage. For the working women we take the observed wage information as their market wage while
for the non-working we impute their expected market wage using a wage estimation with selection
correction.7 The gross earnings information is the key input for the microsimulation model which
describes in detail all relevant transfer programmes, the SSC and income taxation. Hence it is
possible to calculate the required state speciﬁc net-household income Cik. The leisure time at each
hours point is simply the time endowment T = 80 minus the deﬁned working time.
In order to estimate the preferences for consumption and leisure we assume that the error terms
ik are i.i.d and follow an extreme value distribution. This gives us an expression of the probability
for each discrete working alternative which results in the well known conditional logit framework
that can be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Descriptive statistics
The empirical estimation is based on the German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP) which is
a representative household survey for Germany with all necessary information to estimate labor
supply behavior (Haisken De-New and Frick, 2005). For this analysis we make use of data collected
in 2005 which yields the information for the tax year 2004. As mentioned above, we deﬁne K = 5
discrete working alternatives to describe the working behavior of the married women. We restrict
the sample to households with a wife aged between 20 and 60 who is not self-employed, retired or
in full-time education. This gives us a sample of 2106 households. The following table yields the
overall distribution of the households at the deﬁned working alternatives with the average working
6For practical reasons we make several assumptions and simpliﬁcations in the estimation procedure. We do not
account for unobserved heterogeneity and do not model potential restrictions on the labor market such as Aaberge
et al. (2006) or Bargain et al. (2008). Haan (2006) has shown that unobserved heterogeneity does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the labor supply elasticities when using a similar speciﬁcation with cross sectional data. The ﬁndings of Bargain
et al. (2008) imply that demand side constraints in particular bias elasticities for men and single women, and tend
to be less severe for the labor supply decision of married women.
7Estimation results can be obtained by the authors upon request.
13hours and the average monthly net household income at each point.
[Table 1 : about here]
As well documented in the literature participation rates of married women are relatively low in
Germany. On average, roughly 30% of the women in our sample do not work. Moreover, part time
work is very popular amongst German women. We ﬁnd that the majority of the working women
works less than full time. About 15% of women work less than 15 hours and close to 30% work
between 16 and 34 hours. Slightly less than 20% of women work full-time and only 6% over-time.
Even for households with non-working women the average net household income amounts to 2800
Euro per month. This is partly due to child related beneﬁts and to the male gross earnings. For
the population of interest means-tested transfers are only of minor importance since for the large
majority of the households these transfers are withdrawn given the husbands earnings. Moreover, as
we will discuss below the marginal tax rates a household with a non-working wife faces are relatively
low due to the joint income taxation. This, on the other hand leads to a relatively moderate increase
of the average net income with increasing working hours of the wife.
In Table 2 we present the distribution of households conditional on the earnings of the husband.
We deﬁne three earnings intervals of the full-time working men, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000.
[Table 2 : about here]
Disaggregating the female working distribution by the earnings level of her husband, we ﬁnd a
fairly similar pattern. Interestingly, women married to a man with high earnings tend to have the
lowest participation rates going along with high rates of part time work. One reason for that could
be an income eﬀect, yet as shown in Table 3, important demographic characteristics diﬀer between
the three groups.
[Table 3 : about here]
As expected we ﬁnd the highest share of East Germans (40%) among the households with low
earnings. Only 11% and 6% of the medium or high earning households are east German. As female
labor supply is still higher in the eastern part, this is the main reason for the higher participation
rate of women married to a husband with low earnings. On the contrary women in this group tend
to be younger and are more likely to have a child younger than 6 years which should reduce their
participation rate.
14Estimation results
In the Appendix we present the estimation results of the discrete choice labor supply model. Due
to the non-linearities and the multiple interactions in the speciﬁcation, the interpretation of the
coeﬃcients is not too meaningful. Instead we derive standard labor supply elasticities with respect
to changes in gross wages. It is important to stress that these elasticities diﬀer from the elasticities
derived in the theoretical model which we labeled mobility elasticities. The standard labor supply
elasticities we present in the following table are simply seen as speciﬁcation check of the model and
are not used for the simulation of the optimal tax rule.
In the discrete choice model elasticities cannot be derived analytically. Therefore, we apply a
numerical procedure. More precisely, we predict the labor supply behavior before and after a 1%
change in gross wages. The relative increase in working hours and in the participation rate given
the wage increase measures the labor supply behavior. We disentangle the eﬀect with respect to
working hours and derive elasticities on the intensive and the extensive margin, where the latter
captures the behavioral eﬀect of the women out-of work and the former of those in-work. Again,
we show the average eﬀects conditional on the earnings level of the husband.
[Table 4 : about here]
Overall the elasticities are in line with those found in previous studies for Germany as well as
for other European countries, e.g. Aaberge et al. (1995), Bonin et al. (2003), Bargain and Orsini
(2006), or Haan and Steiner (2005). In line with the distribution of working hours (Table 1) we ﬁnd
fairly similar elasticities by subgroups. A 1% increase in gross wages leads in all groups to a relative
increase of the female participation rate by 0.2%. With respect to working hours the relative eﬀects
diﬀer between 0.34% and 0.39%. Interestingly we ﬁnd very similar eﬀects on the intensive and
the extensive margin. At ﬁrst glance this seems surprising as it has been shown that responses at
the extensive margin tend to dominate (Heckman, 1993). However, given the extreme large share
of women working only very few hours per week, this result is plausible. When disentangling the
working hours eﬀect by non-work, part-time and full-time/over-time work, we ﬁnd the well known
eﬀect that workers in regular full-time jobs hardly adjust their working behavior.
154 Numerical Simulation
In the following, we apply the above derived framework of optimal taxation jointly with the esti-
mated preferences and simulate the optimal marginal welfare weights for a tax system which taxes
married household jointly. In other words, we derive the marginal welfare weights that make the
given tax system optimal. For the analysis we use the German tax and transfer system in which
married couples ﬁle their taxes jointly.8 We compare the results for the joint tax system with the
marginal welfare weights derived in a hypothetical tax and transfer system with individual taxation.
More precisely, we derive the net income for married couples in Germany assuming individual taxa-
tion and derive the welfare function that makes this system optimal. For the analysis of individual
taxation we allow for the endogeneity of labor supply and estimate the counterfactual shares of
households at the discrete earnings point.
The German tax and transfer system with joint taxation
The German transfer system consists of several diﬀerent income-support programs.9 These pro-
grammes have diﬀerent target groups and vary in their design. All out-of work beneﬁts are tar-
geted at households and beneﬁts are strongly withdrawn with family earnings. Therefore, married
households with one full-time working spouse are in general not eligible for theses transfers. Only
households with numerous children and low wages might still receive some transfers even with a
full time working family member. In Germany, child beneﬁts are unconditional on earnings and for
each dependent child a household receives about 150 Euro per month.
For our application the design of income taxation is more important. In theory, the German
income tax is based on the principle of comprehensive income taxation. That is, the sum of a
household’s income from all sources is taxed at a single rate after several deductions have been
applied. The tax schedule is linear progressive with a top marginal rate of 45%. In contrast to
other European countries, such as the UK, in Germany, married couples are taxed jointly. This
implies that the income tax of a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half
of the sum of the spouses’ incomes; this amount is then doubled to determine the tax amount of
the couple. Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) provide a detailed discussion and analysis of the German
8Married couples have the possibility to choose between joint and individual taxation, yet as only for very few
households there would be an advantage of individual taxation, we assume that all married couples ﬁle jointly.
9In line with the data, we describe the tax and transfer legislation of the year 2004.
16system of joint taxation and calculate the splitting advantage, that is the tax reduction of joint
taxation relative to individual taxation. Due to the progressivity of the income taxation this
advantage is increasing with household gross earnings and is highest for households where only one
spouse works.
In addition to taxes, working people pay social security contributions (SSC). These include,
unemployment (6.5% of gross earnings) and health insurance (about 17% of gross earnings) and
pension contributions (19.5% of gross earnings). In general, employer and employee pay half of the
contributions. The so called Mini/Midi-Job programm excludes individuals with earnings lower
than 400/800 euros from the SSC contributions. Moreover, below this threshold individuals are
either exempted from income taxation or pay a reduced tax rate. Above this threshold, individuals
pay the full amount of SSC and income taxation which creates very high eﬀective marginal tax
rates. This is in particular true for the secondary earner due to the system of joint taxation.10
A hypothetical German tax and transfer system with individual taxation
For this hypothetical scenario we assume that the transfer system in not aﬀected and the SSC
remain the same. Moreover, the same tax function is applied. The only diﬀerence in this scenario
is that married spouses are taxed individually.
4.1 Discrete Earnings Points
In line with the empirical distribution of female yearly gross earning we deﬁne the following I discrete
yearly gross earnings points for the wives: 0, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 55000. We hardly observe
households in which the women earns more than her full-time working husband. Therefore, for the
numerical simulations we assume that the wife can not earn more than her husband. This implies
that we allow the intra-household inequality degree θ to take values only between 1 and 0.5.
The following table shows the relative shares at the earnings points conditional on the earnings
of the husband. These are the observed shares in the data which correspond to the system of joint
taxation. In addition, we present for each subgroup the monthly net tax rates, the household income
10In contrast to the above mentioned transfers, the subsidy for the Mini-job is provided at the individual level. As
the SSC contributions can be seen as an individual insurance it is not straight-forward to allocate the contributions
to the household. This is in particular true for the unemployment insurance. Only the working spouses proﬁts
from this insurance. Parts of the pensions go to the non-working spouse in terms of a widowers pension which is
signiﬁcantly lower than the own pension. Only the health insurance does cover both partners. There is an upper-
bound of contributions. Therefore one-earner households with high earnings might slightly beneﬁt from the design
of SSC contribution on the top of joint taxation. This will not be analyzed in this study.
17and the marginal tax rates. We derive average net tax payments. That implies the demographic
characteristics - most important number of children - at all earnings points of the wife are the same
and the only diﬀerence is due to income taxation at the diﬀerent earnings.
[Table 5: about here]
Given the restriction about the wife’s earning we deﬁne 4 earnings points for the households
with a low-earnings husband, 5 points for the medium and 6 for the households where the husband
has high earnings. In line with the working behavior shown in Table 1, we ﬁnd in each group a
large proportion of households at the lowest earnings point at which the wife is not working. On
the contrary, only relatively few women reach similar earnings as their partners do. In the last 3
columns we show the eﬀect of joint income taxation which is best summarized by the marginal tax
rates (MTR). Note, as the households conditional on the husbands earnings diﬀer by demographic
characteristics the MTR are not comparable between groups but only within groups. For all points
we ﬁnd relatively high eﬀective marginal tax rates. This is the well understood eﬀect of the SSC
contributions and the income tax payments in the German system. Most interesting is the high
marginal tax rate at the ﬁrst earnings point of the wife. Although she has very low individual gross
earnings the wife is confronted with high marginal tax rates since she pays from the beginning the
same marginal tax rate as her full-time working husband. This is the eﬀect of joint taxation.
The diﬀerence between joint and individual taxation is shown in Table 6 where we present the
simulated eﬀects of the hypothetical system of individual taxation.
[Table 6: about here]
For this hypothetical scenario, we cannot observe the shares at the discrete earnings points.
Therefore, we use the structural estimates and predict the shares at each point under individual
taxation using a calibration technique described in the following section. In line with Steiner and
Wrohlich (2004), we ﬁnd a strong increase in participation rate in the system of individual taxation
relative to joint taxation. This eﬀect in particular pronounced for women married to a husband
with high earnings. The MTRs in the last column highlight the diﬀerence between the two tax
regimes. When assuming individual taxation we ﬁnd markedly lower marginal tax rates at the low
earnings points which increase with the individual gross earnings of the wife.
184.2 Mobility Elasticities
Based on the estimated preferences we can derive the mobility elasticities for the wives as deﬁned
above in the theoretical model. For consistency several assumptions and clariﬁcations need to be
stressed. These assumptions are necessary as the I discrete earnings points deﬁned by the gov-
ernment might diﬀer from the K discrete working hours of the women used in the labor supply
estimation. First of all, we need to assume that there exists a continuous distribution of working
hours and that the estimated preferences for consumption and leisure hold over the whole distrib-
ution and not only at the deﬁned discrete working hours. Further, individuals diﬀer in their gross
hourly wages. Therefore, women might work diﬀerent hours in order to reach the deﬁned I earnings
points. Depending on the wage this might even restrict the set of earnings points for some women
since we assume a maximum labor supply of 60 hours per week. More precisely, women with low
wages can never reach high earnings points. The mentioned assumptions and simpliﬁcations can
be relaxed by increasing the number of discrete earnings points and modelling further individual
hours constraints similar to Aaberge et al. (2005).
As deﬁned in Equation 14, we need to derive the mobility elasticity between all discrete combi-
nations of the I earnings points. ϕi,j measures the relative shift of women from point i to point j
given a marginal increase in the work incentives. More precisely, we increase the income at given
point j by adding 1% of the absolute diﬀerence Cj−Ci, which is equivalent to a marginal increase in
the budget line between these two points. Given the change in the work incentives we predicted the
relative share of women who adjust their labor supply and switch from point i to point j. Hence,
ϕi,j only aﬀects the behavior of women at points i and j. However, since we derive ixI −1 mobility
elasticities our speciﬁcation is ﬂexible as conditional on the above mentioned restriction of women
with low wages, wives can adjust and switch between any discrete point.
Technically, we derive the elasticities in the following way. Based on the estimated preferences
and calibrated draws from the extreme value distributed error terms ik we simulate the observed
shares of households at each discrete earnings point. This calibration technique, e.g. Duncan and
Weeks (1997), provides a vector of error terms that guarantee that the observed choice is yields the
maximal utility. In order to provide robust results we derive a large number R of optimal extreme
value draws (R=100).
Based on the estimated preferences and the R draws from the extreme value distribution we
predict for any mobility elasticity ϕi,j the relative share at the two points i and j before and after
19the change in work incentives. The average of the relative transitions from point i to j measure
the mobility elasticity. Note, as the mobility elasticity is based on a relative concept the size of the
elasticity does not only depend on the structural preferences and the slope of the budget line but
as well on the relative shares of each group.
The matrix of the mobility elasticities is presented in the Appendix. In addition to the mobility
elasticities for the scenario of joint taxation, we present as well the mobility elasticities in a hypo-
thetical scenario of individual taxation. Since we simulate the shares at the discrete earnings points
for the system of individual taxation we account for the endogeneity of labor supply with respect
to the tax regime.
4.3 Marginal welfare weights
Based on the estimated mobility elasticities and the shares and tax payments at the discrete points
we can simulate the system of equations deﬁned in Equation (16) to obtain the marginal welfare
weights which make a given tax system optimal. It is important to stress again that we analyze
the optimal marginal welfare weights in a partial setting since we assume that taxation of all
other groups remains constant. Moreover, as discussed above, the government chooses the tax
rates to maximize a welfare function given the behavior of the households. In this sense the
government knows the structural preferences of the women at the diﬀerent earnings points and
thus it understands the mobility elasticities. Therefore, the government has a clear idea about the
distortions and ineﬃciency of income taxation induced by the behavioral responses of households.
The key question we want to study in this empirical application is how the optimal marginal
welfare weights diﬀer between joint and individual taxation with respect to the intra-household
inequality index θ. As deﬁned above we measure θ as the relative share of the husband’s earnings
on the total household earnings. As in our setting the earnings of the husband are exogenously
given, θ is directly linked to the wife’s earnings points.
In our framework it is diﬃcult to derive conclusions about the optimal marginal welfare weights
by joint household earnings and about the optimal degree of progressivity in a tax system. We com-
pare three diﬀerent household groups separately, and as mentioned above comparison between the
groups are not possible because of the diﬀerent demographic composition of the groups. Therefore,
we can only derive conclusions about the welfare function by female gross earnings conditional on
the husbands earnings. While this analysis yields interesting ﬁndings with respect to the taxation
20of the secondary earner, it is less informative for the analysis of progressivity which needed to be
based on the joint household earnings.
Marginal welfare weights by female gross earnings
Before comparing the marginal welfare weights by intra-household inequality between the two tax
regimes, we present the welfare weights by the above deﬁned gross earnings points of the wife.
As mentioned above we restrict the gross earnings points for the wives not to be higher than the
earnings of her husband and therefore we observe a diﬀerent number of discrete earnings points by
earnings group.
[Figure 1: about here]
Overall, we ﬁnd for the three earnings groups a fairly similar distribution of the marginal welfare
weights that make joint taxation optimal. For all groups the marginal weights for households with
non-working wives are relatively large and with increasing gross earnings of the wife the marginal
weights tend to decrease.
Two speciﬁc results are important to discuss. First, we ﬁnd an interesting dip in the welfare
function at the ﬁrst hours point at 833 Euro per month. This dip is in line with the withdrawal design
of the subsidies provided by the Mini/Midi Jobs programm. As discussed, above the threshold of
800 Euros households face a fairly high marginal tax rate. Ceteris paribus, this design of the tax
and transfer system is only optimal if the government has a relatively low welfare weight for this
group. The second striking result is that for the higher earnings points we ﬁnd relative low or even
negative marginal welfare weights. This implies that, given the behavioral responses of the women,
the German system of joint taxation is only optimal if the government has little or even a negative
value for given an extra Euro to married households in which the women has relatively high gross
earnings. In other words, the welfare function of the government would increase if ceteris paribus
women would decrease their labor supply and reduce their gross earnings.
Note, the downward sloping marginal welfare weights do not per-se reveal a high taste for redis-
tribution of the government since the equality concept is based on equivalized household earnings
and not on the individual earnings of one parter. However, the shape of the welfare function in
terms the wife’s gross earnings can be interpreted relatively to her husbands earnings to derive con-
clusions about the taste of the government for the intra-household inequality. This will be discussed
21in detail in the next section.
[Figure 2: about here]
The shape of the marginal welfare function with respect to female gross earnings that would
make individual taxation optimal looks quite diﬀerent. Still, we ﬁnd for all three groups the highest
marginal welfare weights for households in which the wife is not working. However, the marginal
welfare weights for the households with a working wife are much more similar to those of households
where the women stays at home. The dip at the ﬁrst earnings point is still visible, however less
pronounced. In contrast to joint taxation, the optimality of individual taxation does not imply
negative marginal welfare weights at higher earnings points.
Marginal welfare weights by intra-household inequality
In the following we analyze the optimal marginal welfare weights by the intra-household inequality
for joint and individual taxation. In Figure 3 - 5 we present the shape of the two marginal welfare
functions separately for the deﬁned earnings groups of the husband. This comparison between the
groups allows us to shed some light on the eﬀect of the splitting advantage - the gain from joint
taxation relative to individual taxation - by the intra-household inequality and by household gross
earnings.
[Figure 3: about here]
For women married to a husband with low earnings we ﬁnd a fairly similar structure of the
optimal marginal welfare function for joint and individual taxation. As highlighted above, for
households in which the wife is out-of-work the marginal welfare weight needs to be higher in order
to make both tax systems optimal. On the other hand, the optimal marginal welfare weights for
the households with a working women are higher under individual taxation. At θ = 0.5, that is the
point where both spouses have identical earnings, the optimal marginal welfare weight for individual
taxation is about 0.6 and for joint taxation is amounts to 0.2.
As discussed above, if θ = 0.5 joint and individual taxation do not diﬀer. Therefore, we could
expect that at this point the marginal welfare weights in the two regimes are identical. The diﬀerence
we ﬁnd has several reasons. Most important the welfare weights at one speciﬁc discrete point depend
on the net tax rates at all other points. Therefore the implication for joint and individual taxation
22must be diﬀerent even at θ = 0.5. Moreover, the marginal welfare weights depend on the shares
at the discrete points and the mobility elasticities in each regime. As shown, the shares and the
mobility elasticities diﬀer quite markedly between the two tax regimes.
[Figures 4 and 5: about here]
We have shown that joint taxation for households with men working for medium or high earnings
is only optimal if at high earnings points the marginal welfare weights are very low or even negative.
This is depicted by the marginal weights for joint taxation at θ close to 0.5. On the contrary, at θ
=1, we ﬁnd the highest optimal marginal welfare weights.
Diﬀerently for individual taxation: the inequality index does only moderately aﬀect the optimal
marginal welfare function. For θ =1, we ﬁnd lower optimal marginal welfare functions than under
joint taxation. On the other hand, the marginal weights for households with working women are
always positive. In line with the ﬁndings for the households with low earnings this implies that
individual taxation is optimal without a strong discrimination by the intra-household inequality.
Comparing the results by earnings groups we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between joint and indi-
vidual taxation are strongest for women married to husbands with high earnings. The diﬀerence
between the marginal welfare weights at θ= 0.5, is for the low earnings group about 0.4, for the
medium group, 0.5 and for the highest group it is close to 0.8. The ranking is similar at other
values of θ.
This variation is in line with the design of the splitting advantage. As discussed the splitting
advantage does not only depend on the intra-household inequality but as well of the joint household
earnings. The higher the joint household earnings, the higher is the marginal tax rate and thus,
the advantage of joint versus individual taxation.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have empirically derived the government’s marginal welfare function that guar-
antees that joint taxation of married couples is optimal. This marginal welfare function has been
compared to the welfare function required to make individual taxation optimal.
The theoretical framework behind our analysis is a discrete optimal tax model similar to Saez
(2002) with a simpliﬁed utility maximization in which the wife conditions her labor supply behavior
on the employment of the men. In the empirical application we estimate the behavior of the wife
23using a static structural labor supply model. Based on the estimated preferences we derive the
required mobility elasticities for solving the theoretical model of optimal taxation. Therefore, our
framework accounts for the heterogeneity of labor supply behavior.
Applying the optimal tax model for Germany, we ﬁnd that the marginal welfare weights that
make a system of joint taxation optimal are quite diﬀerent from those marginal welfare weights that
guarantee optimality for individual taxation. While overall in both systems the optimal marginal
welfare weights tend to decrease with gross earnings of the secondary earner (in our application
by assumption the wife), the shape of the welfare function is quite distinct. Under joint taxation
the optimal marginal welfare weights at higher earnings of the wife are much lower that under
individual taxation. This result is even re-enforced when deriving the marginal welfare weights by
the intra-household inequality. We show that the system of joint taxation is only optimal when
the government has a high taste for redistribution towards couples with a high intra-household
inequality, i.e. where the secondary earner is not working, and a very low or even negative taste
for redistribution when both partners earn a similar amount. Under individual taxation this is
diﬀerent. The optimal marginal welfare weights are only slightly decreasing with the inequality
within the households. In other words in this scenario the optimality depends less on the working
composition within the household.
In line with previous studies (e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich (2004)), which show that in particular
households with high earnings beneﬁt from joint taxation, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the
optimal marginal welfare function for joint and individual taxation is strongest for households with
high earnings.
It is important to stress that our ﬁndings are not only the results of the mechanical eﬀect of this
hypothetical tax reform. The optimal tax model accounts as well for the behavioral eﬀect induced
by the reform measured by the mobility elasticity and the endogeneity of female labor supply.
We see our results as complementary to the ﬁndings of Alesina et al. (2007) or Kleven et al.
(2008). Whereas these papers provide theoretical arguments against the optimality of joint taxation
assuming a welfare function of the government our results are more descriptive. We show that joint
taxation is only optimal if the government strongly diﬀerentiates by intra-household inequality and
this favors an economy where the secondary earner does not work. In contrast individual taxation
is optimal without strongly discriminating the working composition within the household.
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26Appendix
Estimation Results
, [Table 7 : about here]
Mobility Elasticities between Discrete Earnings Points
Conditional on the husband’s earnings we calculate the mobility elasticities between the discrete
points which are shown in the following Tables. We derive the mobility elasticities separately for
the scenario of joint and individual taxation.
[Table 8: about here]
As mentioned above, the mobility elasticities measure the relative change from point i to point
k given a marginal increase in the income at point k. Given the diﬀerent share at the points these
elasticities are by deﬁnition not symmetric. Ceteris paribus, the higher the share at point i the
larger the elasticity. Moreover, the taste for income and leisure and the tax system deﬁne the
behavioral changes. In general, we ﬁnd high responses to neighboring categories and on average
higher behavioral eﬀects at lower earning points.
[Table 9: about here]
The mobility elasticities diﬀer between individual and joint taxation as the relative shares and
the work incentives are diﬀerent. Overall, the structure is fairly similar with high elasticities at the
lower earning points.
27Table 1: Discrete Employment States
Employment Share Hours Women Net income
(%) (per week) (in Euro)
0 29.06 0 2803
1 18.00 10 3164
2 29.01 23 3454
3 18.33 38 3860
4 5.60 42 3997
The following working hours (weekly) classiﬁcations are
used: 0, 0-14, 15-34, 35-40, >40. Net household income
(monthly) is calculated on basis of the microsimulation
model STSM. The net household income is the mean in-
come in the given alternative.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005, STSM.
Table 2: Discrete Employment States by Earnings Groups
Employment All Low earnings Medium earnings High earnings
0 29.06 24.55 30.17 34.11
1 18.00 13.95 20.25 19.72
2 29.01 28.31 30.58 26.68
3 18.33 25.94 14.30 14.62
4 5.60 7.25 4.70 4.87
The following working hours (weekly) classiﬁcations are used: 0, 0-14, 15-34, 35-
40, >40. Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings
of the husband, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
28Table 3: Discrete Employment States by Earnings Groups
Earnings groups All Child 0-6 Child 7-16 East German
Low 41.4 19.10 37.79 40.44
Medium 42.3 18.05 45.30 11.48
High 44.6 15.31 47.33 6.03
All 42.5 17.85 43.16 20.22
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings
of the husband, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000. Child 0-6 indicates
the percentage of households with at least one child younger than six,
Child 7-16 with at least one child between seven and sixteen. East
is an indicator for the share of households in a group living in East
Germany.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
Table 4: Female Labor Supply Elasticities
Earnings group Participation Hours Extensive Intensive
Low 0.18 0.34 0.17 0.16
Medium 0.21 0.39 0.22 0.17
High 0.20 0.35 0.21 0.18
All 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.17
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings
of the husband, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000. Female elasticities
are numerically derived with respect to a 1% increase in female gross
wage. Participation measures the relative (%) increase in the partic-
ipation rate and Hours the relative increase in weekly working hours.
Extensive measures the relative increase in working hours due to the
new participants, Intensive the increase due to the women already
working.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
29Table 5: Earnings Points: Joint Taxation
Earnings Points Share Gross Earnings Net Tax Payments Net Income MTR.
Low Earnings
0 0.24 2021.68 264.96 1756.73 -
1 0.35 2855.02 640.78 2214.23 0.45
2 0.23 3688.35 1062.01 2626.34 0.51
3 0.18 4521.68 1491.50 3030.19 0.52
Medium Earnings
0 0.30 3191.10 814.98 2376.12 -
1 0.35 4024.43 1209.74 2814.68 0.47
2 0.18 4857.76 1647.48 3210.28 0.53
3 0.10 5691.10 2102.58 3588.52 0.55
4 0.06 6524.43 2567.78 3956.65 0.56
High Earnings
0 0.35 5172.93 1695.55 3477.38
1 0.25 6006.27 2129.09 3877.18 0.52
2 0.16 6839.60 2601.71 4237.89 0.57
3 0.13 7672.93 3095.92 4577.01 0.59
4 0.05 8506.27 3611.05 4895.22 0.62
5 0.06 9756.27 4360.49 5395.78 0.60
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the husband, < 30000;
30000-50000; > 50000. Earnings points are related to the following gross female earnings 0,
10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 55000. The MTR. is the eﬀective marginal tax rate computed as
the diﬀerence in the household tax payments w.r.t. the increase in the gross earnings. All
information are in Euro per months
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
Table 6: Earnings Points: Individual Taxation
Earnings Points Share Gross Earnings Net Tax Payments Net Income MTR.
Low Earnings
0 0.21 2021.68 474.95 1546.74 -
1 0.37 2855.02 702.95 2152.07 0.27
2 0.24 3688.35 1064.18 2624.17 0.43
3 0.18 4521.68 1496.13 3025.55 0.52
Medium Earnings
0 0.24 3191.10 1137.06 2054.04 -
1 0.38 4024.43 1320.46 2703.97 0.22
2 0.20 4857.76 1676.82 3180.94 0.43
3 0.11 5691.10 2105.53 3585.57 0.51
4 0.06 6524.43 2568.32 3956.11 0.56
High Earnings
0 0.26 5172.93 2237.86 2935.07
1 0.29 6006.27 2415.78 3590.49 0.21
2 0.19 6839.60 2771.04 4068.56 0.43
3 0.14 7672.93 3199.27 4473.67 0.51
4 0.06 8506.27 3661.79 4844.48 0.56
5 0.06 9756.27 4363.64 5392.62 0.56
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the husband, < 30000;
30000-50000; > 50000. Earnings points are related to the following gross female earnings 0,
10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 55000. The MTR. is the eﬀective marginal tax rate computed as
the diﬀerence in the household tax payments w.r.t. the increase in the gross earnings. All
information are in Euro per months
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
30Table 7: Female Labor Supply Elasticities
Coeﬃcients Standard Error
Consumption*Age1 of Man 5.2266 3.8401
Consumption*Age2 of Man -0.1139 0.3762
Consumption*Age3 of Man -0.0745 0.2483
Consumption*Age4 of Man -0.1293 0.1966
Consumption*Age1 of Woman -1.3763 3.0311
Consumption*Age2 of Woman 0.0507 0.7822
Consumption*Age3 of Woman 0.0891 0.6088
Consumption*Age4 of Woman 0.4139 0.5723
Consumption*Child 0 - 6 0.7873 0.3637
Consumption*Child 7 - 16 0.1021 0.3270
Consumption 2.1445 0.6780
Consumption2 -0.1101 0.0401
Leisure*Age1 of Woman -5.8432 6.5536
Leisure*Age2 of Woman -5.0614 2.1939
Leisure*Age3 of Woman -4.7448 1.8370
Leisure*Age4 of Woman -2.3867 1.7590
Leisure*Child 0 - 3 10.0970 0.9209
Leisure*Child 4 - 6 6.4909 1.1483






Part-time 1 -2.4412 0.1976
Part-time 2 -2.1455 0.2433
Log likelihood -2831.1381
The following age groups have been deﬁned: Age1 (< 25), Age2 (25 -
35), Age3 (35 - 45), Age4 (45 - 55), Age5 (> 55) is the base category.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
31Table 8: Mobility Elasticities: Joint Taxation
Earnings Points 0 1 2 3 4 5
Low Earnings
0 - 0.6315 0.3893 0.2125 - -
1 0.1898 - 0.2291 0.1463 - -
2 0.1962 0.1000 - 0.1652 - -
3 0.0871 0.0427 0.0726 - - -
Medium Earnings
0 - 0.4589 0.2240 0.1404 0.0565 -
1 0.2222 - 0.1281 0.0870 0.0328 -
2 0.2881 0.1438 - 0.1108 0.1097 -
3 0.1879 0.0848 0.1303 - 0.0768 -
4 0.0817 0.0483 0.0650 0.0250 - -
High Earnings
0 - 0.2099 0.1599 0.1322 0.0493 0.0213
1 0.2622 - 0.0856 0.0964 0.0279 0.0192
2 0.3261 0.1058 - 0.1043 0.0928 0.0638
3 0.1500 0.0571 0.0571 - 0.0375 0.0917
4 0.0773 0.0636 0.1318 0.0864 - 0.1350
5 0.0001 0.0222 0.0074 0.0407 0.0037 -
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the
husband, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000. Mobility elasticities are derived
based on the estimated coeﬃcients and calibrated draws from the extreme
value distributed error terms.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
Table 9: Mobility Elasticities: Individual Taxation
Earnings Points 0 1 2 3 4 5
Low Earnings
0 - 0.5047 0.2927 0.0790 - -
1 0.2679 - 0.1015 0.0692 - -
2 0.2051 0.1424 - 0.1551 - -
3 0.0834 0.0549 0.0867 - - -
Medium Earnings
0 - 0.4760 0.2568 0.0913 0.0263 -
1 0.2856 - 0.1084 0.0383 0.0142 -
2 0.3010 0.2104 - 0.0963 0.0754 -
3 0.1847 0.1236 0.1578 - 0.0727 -
4 0.1061 0.0701 0.0959 0.0294 - -
High Earnings
0 - 0.4343 0.3025 0.1241 0.0322 0.0001
1 0.3607 - 0.1100 0.0400 0.0230 0.0079
2 0.3495 0.1679 - 0.0894 0.0540 0.0061
3 0.1627 0.0752 0.1231 - 0.0367 0.0265
4 0.1209 0.0679 0.1271 0.0852 - 0.0408
5 0.0074 0.0292 0.0147 0.0624 0.0184 -
Earnings groups are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the
husband, < 30000; 30000-50000; > 50000. Mobility elasticities are derived
based on the estimated coeﬃcients and calibrated draws from the extreme
value distributed error terms.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005.
32Figure 1: Marginal Welfare Weights by Gross Earnings: Joint Taxation
Notes: Gross earnings are the monthly earnings of the wife. Earnings groups low, medium
and high, are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the husband, < 30000;
30000-50000; > 50000.
Figure 2: Marginal Welfare Weights by Gross Earnings: Individual Taxation
Notes: Gross earnings are the monthly earnings of the wife. Earnings groups low, medium
and high, are deﬁned according to the full-time gross earnings of the husband, < 30000;
30000-50000; > 50000.
33Figure 3: Marginal Welfare Weights by Intra-Household Inequality: Low Earnings




yh , the male share of the overall earnings.
The index is 1 if the wife is not working.
Figure 4: Marginal Welfare Weights by Intra-Household Inequality: Medium Earn-
ings




yh , the male share of the overall earnings.
The index is 1 if the wife is not working.
34Figure 5: Marginal Welfare Weights by Intra-Household Inequality: High Earnings




yh , the male share of the overall earnings.
The index is 1 if the wife is not working.
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